
Introduction
The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) [1] represents a paradigm shift in India’s approach to resolving insolvency and bankruptcy matters. Enacted to consolidate and amend laws relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms, and individuals in a time-bound manner, the IBC has fundamentally transformed the landscape of creditor rights and corporate restructuring in India. Among its various procedural provisions, Section 61 of the IBC, which governs appeals to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), has emerged as a critical provision that demands strict adherence to timelines and procedural compliance.
The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Chennai Bench, in the matter of Mathew Mylakulath Jose vs. Kizhakkekara Kuriakose Jose & Resolution Professional of ITMA Hotels India Pvt Ltd & Anr [2], delivered a significant judgment that clarified the position on condonation of delay in filing appeals under Section 61 of the IBC. This judgment, presided over by Mr. Justice Rakesh Kumar Jain (Judicial Member) and Ms. Shreesha Merla (Technical Member), has reinforced the legislative intent behind the strict timelines prescribed under the Code and has set important precedents for future insolvency proceedings.
The case involved an application seeking condonation of delay in filing an appeal beyond the permissible forty-five day period prescribed under Section 61 of the IBC. The Tribunal’s observations and conclusions in this matter have far-reaching implications for all stakeholders in the insolvency ecosystem, including operational creditors, financial creditors, corporate debtors, resolution professionals, and other interested parties who may seek to challenge orders passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).
Understanding Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC)
Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), titled “Appeals and Appellate Authority,” provides the statutory framework for filing appeals against orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority, which in the case of corporate persons is the National Company Law Tribunal. The provision reads as follows:
“61. (1) Save as otherwise provided under this Code, an appeal shall lie from an order of the Adjudicating Authority before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal on a question of law or fact arising out of such order under this Code.
(2) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Adjudicating Authority may file an appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the date of receipt of the order of Adjudicating Authority:
Provided that the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal but such period shall not exceed fifteen days.” [1]
The provision establishes a clear timeline: appeals must be filed within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order passed by the NCLT. The proviso to Section 61(2) provides for a limited window of condonation, allowing the NCLAT to entertain appeals filed beyond thirty days only if there was sufficient cause for the delay. However, this additional period of condonation cannot exceed fifteen days, thereby establishing an absolute bar of forty-five days for filing appeals under the IBC.
This strict timeline distinguishes the IBC from other civil procedural laws in India. For instance, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides broader discretion to courts to condone delay if sufficient cause is shown, without imposing an upper limit on the period of condonation. However, the Supreme Court of India in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank [3] has unequivocally held that the IBC is a complete code in itself and that general provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to proceedings under the Code. This position was further reinforced in B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates [4], where the Supreme Court emphasized that the timelines prescribed under the IBC are mandatory and not directory in nature.
The legislative intent behind these strict timelines is rooted in the overall objective of the IBC to resolve insolvency matters in a time-bound manner. The Code was enacted following recommendations of the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee, which emphasized the need for swift resolution of insolvency to maximize the value of assets and promote entrepreneurship. Any delay in the appeal process would have a cascading effect on the entire insolvency resolution process, potentially leading to value erosion and defeating the very purpose for which the Code was enacted.
The Mathew Mylakulath Jose Case: Facts and Judicial Observations
In the case of Mathew Mylakulath Jose vs. Kizhakkekara Kuriakose Jose & Resolution Professional of ITMA Hotels India Pvt Ltd & Anr, the appellant filed an appeal before the NCLAT Chennai challenging an order passed by the NCLT. However, the appeal was filed on the forty-sixth day from the date of receipt of the impugned order, thereby exceeding the maximum permissible period of forty-five days prescribed under Section 61(2) of the IBC.
The appellant filed an application seeking condonation of the one-day delay in filing the appeal. The application presumably contained grounds explaining the reasons for the delay. However, the NCLAT Chennai Bench, after considering the application and the statutory provisions, held that the appeal filed on the forty-sixth day could not be entertained by the Tribunal, regardless of the reasons cited for the delay.
The Tribunal made three critical observations in its order:
First, if an appeal is filed on the forty-sixth day, the application for condonation of delay cannot be entertained by the Tribunal. This observation establishes an absolute bar and leaves no room for discretion on the part of the NCLAT to condone delays beyond the forty-five day period, irrespective of the nature or gravity of the reasons cited for such delay.
Second, in a scenario where the timeline is so strict, it is always incumbent upon the person who wishes to challenge the order of the Adjudicating Authority before the Appellate Authority to remain vigilant regarding their rights to file an appeal. This observation places a positive duty on potential appellants to be proactive and diligent in monitoring orders passed by the NCLT and in taking timely steps to file appeals if they are aggrieved by such orders.
Third, and most significantly, the Tribunal held that “sufficient cause” should be an explanation and not an excuse. This distinction between an explanation and an excuse forms the crux of the judgment and provides valuable guidance on how applications for condonation of delay should be approached. The Tribunal concluded that there was no merit in the application for condonation of delay and accordingly dismissed the same.
The judgment reflects the Tribunal’s strict interpretation of the statutory provisions and its unwillingness to adopt a liberal approach in condoning delays in filing appeals under the IBC. This approach is consistent with the overall philosophy of the Code, which seeks to ensure time-bound resolution of insolvency matters without unnecessary delays or procedural complications.
The Distinction Between Explanation and Excuse: Legal Principles
The NCLAT Chennai’s observation that “sufficient cause should be an explanation and not an excuse” introduces an important conceptual distinction that has significant practical implications. While the judgment does not elaborate on this distinction in detail, it draws upon well-established principles of law relating to condonation of delay developed by the Supreme Court of India in various contexts.
An “explanation” in the legal context refers to a statement that provides genuine, verifiable reasons for a particular course of action or inaction, supported by evidence and circumstances beyond the control of the party seeking relief. In contrast, an “excuse” typically refers to a justification that may be self-serving, lacking in substantive merit, or attributable to the party’s own negligence or lack of diligence.
The Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [5] observed that the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction, or negligence. However, this liberal approach has been significantly curtailed in the context of the IBC, where the statutory scheme itself provides for a maximum period of condonation.
Examples of what might constitute an “explanation” in the context of IBC appeals could include: certified illness of the appellant or their authorized representative during the relevant period, demonstrable difficulties in obtaining certified copies of orders from the NCLT registry despite timely application, natural calamities or force majeure events that prevented the filing of the appeal, or genuine confusion regarding the date of receipt of the order where the order was communicated through electronic means and there are technical discrepancies in the system-generated timestamps.
On the other hand, what would typically constitute an “excuse” rather than an explanation would include: general statements about being busy with other professional or personal commitments, ignorance of the law or the prescribed timeline for filing appeals, reliance on erroneous advice from counsel without demonstrating due diligence in verifying such advice, financial difficulties in arranging for the appeal fee or engaging legal representation, or mistakes and oversights on the part of the appellant or their representatives that could have been avoided with reasonable care and attention.
The NCLAT Chennai’s judgment suggests that even if an appellant provides reasons that might technically qualify as an explanation, the Tribunal will scrutinize whether the appellant exercised reasonable diligence and remained vigilant about their appellate rights. The duty of vigilance placed on potential appellants is particularly stringent given the strict timelines under the IBC, and any failure to exercise such vigilance may result in the reasons cited being characterized as excuses rather than genuine explanations.
Judicial Precedents on Condonation of Delay Under Section 61 IBC
The position adopted by the NCLAT Chennai in the Mathew Mylakulath Jose case is consistent with a series of judicial pronouncements by the Supreme Court of India and various benches of the NCLAT on the issue of limitation under Section 61 of the IBC. These precedents collectively establish a jurisprudential framework that emphasizes strict adherence to timelines and limited scope for condonation of delay.
In the landmark judgment of Sagufa Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper India Steel Manufacturing & Engineering Co. Ltd. [6], a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 61 of the IBC and held that the Appellate Tribunal has no power to condone delay in filing an appeal beyond the period of fifteen days from the expiry of the initial thirty-day period. The Court observed that the outer limit prescribed by the proviso to Section 61(2) is mandatory and not directory in nature. This judgment established the foundational principle that the forty-five day period is an absolute bar that cannot be extended by the NCLAT under any circumstances.
The Supreme Court in Sagufa Ahmed further noted that the strict timeline under Section 61 of IBC is consistent with the overall time-bound nature of the IBC, which seeks to complete the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process within a maximum period of 330 days. Allowing unlimited condonation of delay in filing appeals would undermine this time-bound framework and could potentially lead to indefinite prolongation of insolvency proceedings.
Building upon this precedent, the NCLAT has consistently held that appellants must demonstrate exceptional diligence in filing appeals and that routine administrative delays or procedural difficulties will not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In numerous cases, the NCLAT has rejected applications for condonation of delay where appellants cited reasons such as delay in obtaining certified copies of orders, inability to engage counsel within the prescribed period, or miscalculation of the limitation period.
The NCLAT New Delhi Bench, in a recent judgment, emphasized that while a liberal approach may be adopted in condoning delay in refiling appeals where technical defects are cured, the applicant must state specific facts in the application or affidavit to explain the delay. In the absence of any such explanation or justification, the Tribunal has no grounds to exercise its discretion in favor of the applicant. This principle reinforces the need for appellants to provide detailed, specific, and verifiable explanations when seeking condonation of delay.
It is important to note that the computation of the thirty-day period under Section 61(2) begins from the date of receipt of the order by the appellant, not from the date of pronouncement of the order by the NCLT. This distinction is significant because there may be a gap between when an order is passed and when it is formally communicated to the parties. Appellants must therefore maintain accurate records of when they received orders from the NCLT to ensure that they file appeals within the prescribed timeline.
Moreover, in cases where orders are made available electronically through the NCLT’s online portal or through email communication, questions may arise regarding the exact date of receipt. In such situations, the safer course of action for potential appellants is to treat the date of uploading on the portal or the date of email communication as the date of receipt and to calculate the limitation period accordingly, rather than waiting for physical copies of the order.
Practical Implications for Stakeholders in Insolvency Proceedings
The strict interpretation of Section 61 of IBC adopted by the NCLAT Chennai and other judicial forums has significant practical implications for all stakeholders involved in insolvency proceedings under the IBC. These implications extend to operational creditors, financial creditors, corporate debtors, resolution applicants, guarantors, shareholders, and any other parties who may be affected by orders passed by the NCLT during the course of insolvency proceedings.
First and foremost, potential appellants must establish robust internal systems and procedures to monitor orders passed by the NCLT in cases where they are parties or have an interest. This includes regularly checking the NCLT’s online portal for updates, ensuring that authorized representatives are available to receive physical copies of orders when they are dispatched by the Tribunal, and maintaining clear communication channels with legal counsel who are handling matters before the NCLT.
Second, once an order is received, potential appellants should immediately assess whether the order is appealable under Section 61 and whether they have grounds to challenge the order. This assessment should be done as a matter of priority, ideally within the first few days of receiving the order, to allow sufficient time for preparing and filing the appeal within the thirty-day period. Delaying this assessment until closer to the expiry of the thirty-day period significantly increases the risk of missing the deadline.
Third, appellants should ensure that all necessary documents and materials required for filing an appeal are gathered and prepared well in advance of the limitation period. This includes obtaining certified copies of the impugned order and any other relevant orders or documents from the NCLT registry, preparing a comprehensive memorandum of appeal setting out the grounds of challenge, collecting supporting documents and evidence, and arranging for payment of the requisite appeal fee. Any delay in obtaining these materials should be anticipated and factored into the timeline for filing the appeal.
Fourth, legal counsel representing parties in insolvency proceedings bear a heightened responsibility to advise their clients about the strict timelines under Section 61 and to ensure that appeals are filed within the prescribed period. Failure to do so may result in professional liability for the counsel if an appeal is rejected as time-barred due to their negligence or oversight. Lawyers should implement calendar management systems, automated reminders, and cross-verification mechanisms to prevent any inadvertent failure to file appeals within the limitation period.
Fifth, parties should be aware that the NCLAT will not be sympathetic to applications for condonation of delay that cite routine difficulties or procedural challenges as reasons for missing the deadline. The threshold for establishing “sufficient cause” is considerably higher under the IBC compared to other civil proceedings, and applicants must demonstrate exceptional circumstances that were genuinely beyond their control to have any prospect of success in seeking condonation of delay.
Sixth, in cases where there is any ambiguity about whether the forty-fifth day falls on a public holiday or a day on which the NCLAT registry is closed, appellants should err on the side of caution and file the appeal on the immediately preceding working day. While the NCLAT Rules provide for exclusion of holidays in computing limitation periods, relying on such exclusions when operating close to the maximum permissible period of forty-five days involves unnecessary risk that can easily be avoided by filing the appeal earlier.
Resolution Plans and Personal Guarantees: Additional Jurisprudential Developments
While the primary focus of this analysis is on the condonation of delay in filing appeals, it is instructive to examine other significant developments in IBC jurisprudence that have implications for the broader insolvency ecosystem. One such development relates to the treatment of personal guarantees in resolution plans, which has been the subject of considerable judicial attention and debate.
In the case of SVA Family Welfare Trust & Anr v. Ujaas Energy Limited & Ors [7], the NCLAT New Delhi held that a resolution plan can contain a clause that extinguishes security interests, including personal guarantees, after paying compensation to the financial creditor in whose favor such security interest was created. This judgment addressed a contentious issue regarding the extent to which resolution plans approved by the Committee of Creditors can affect the rights of personal guarantors who are not themselves subject to insolvency proceedings.
The facts of the Ujaas Energy case involved a resolution plan that provided for payment of approximately Rs. 23.82 crores to financial creditors as compensation for the release of personal guarantees given by the promoters of the corporate debtor. The Committee of Creditors approved this plan with a 78.04% majority, exercising their commercial wisdom under Section 30(4) of the IBC. However, one of the financial creditors challenged this aspect of the resolution plan, arguing that personal guarantees could not be extinguished without the consent of the guarantors themselves.
The NCLAT held that the Supreme Court’s judgment in State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan & Anr (Lalit Kumar case) [8] could not be read to mean that personal guarantees can never be discharged in a resolution plan. The NCLAT distinguished the facts of the Lalit Kumar case, noting that it dealt with the personal insolvency of guarantors under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and did not concern the treatment of personal guarantees in the context of corporate insolvency resolution under the IBC.
The Tribunal emphasized that it was well within the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors to approve a resolution plan that provided for the release of personal guarantees upon payment of adequate compensation. The NCLAT noted that the resolution plan in Ujaas Energy did not deal with the assets of the personal guarantor but only provided for the release of the personal guarantee that had been granted as security for financial assistance provided to the corporate debtor. Since the financial creditors were receiving compensation for releasing their rights under the personal guarantees, and since this arrangement had been approved by a substantial majority of the Committee of Creditors, the NCLAT held that there was no reason to interfere with this aspect of the resolution plan.
This judgment has significant implications for resolution applicants, personal guarantors, and financial creditors. It establishes that resolution plans can include provisions for the extinguishment of personal guarantees as part of an overall settlement package, provided that adequate compensation is offered to the creditors who hold such guarantees. This flexibility allows for more comprehensive resolution of the corporate debtor’s liabilities and can facilitate the approval of resolution plans that might otherwise face opposition from creditors seeking to preserve their rights against personal guarantors.
However, it is important to note that the treatment of personal guarantees in resolution plans remains a developing area of law, and there have been divergent views expressed by different benches of the NCLAT and by the Supreme Court in various contexts. The interaction between the IBC’s provisions relating to corporate insolvency and the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, relating to contracts of guarantee continues to be a subject of judicial interpretation and refinement.
Comparative Analysis: IBC Timelines vs. Other Appellate Procedures
To fully appreciate the strictness of the timelines under Section 61 of the IBC, it is useful to compare these provisions with limitation periods for filing appeals in other legal contexts in India. This comparative analysis highlights the unique nature of the IBC’s time-bound framework and the legislative policy choices that underpin it.
Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which governs civil litigation in India, appeals from decrees and orders of civil courts are generally required to be filed within specified periods prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. For instance, an appeal from an original decree of a civil court to the District Court must be filed within ninety days from the date of the decree, and an appeal to the High Court must be filed within ninety days from the date of the decree or order appealed from. Section 5 of the Limitation Act empowers courts to condone delay in filing appeals or applications if the court is satisfied that the appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed period.
Importantly, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not impose any maximum limit on the period of delay that can be condoned. The Supreme Court has held in numerous cases that courts should adopt a justice-oriented approach when considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5, and that technical considerations should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice. However, this liberal approach under the Limitation Act stands in stark contrast to the strict, non-extendable timeline under Section 61 of the IBC.
Similarly, under the Companies Act, 2013, appeals from orders of the National Company Law Tribunal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal are governed by Section 421, which provides for filing of appeals within sixty days of the date of communication of the order, with a provision for condonation of delay for a further period of sixty days if the Appellate Tribunal is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the prescribed period. Thus, under the Companies Act, the maximum period for filing appeals with condonation is one hundred and twenty days, which is significantly more lenient than the forty-five day outer limit under the IBC.
The rationale for the more stringent timeline under the IBC lies in the fundamental objectives of the Code. Insolvency proceedings involve time-sensitive commercial decisions and transactions that can significantly impact the value of assets and the prospects of successful resolution. Prolonged litigation at the appellate stage can result in depreciation of asset values, loss of business opportunities, and erosion of stakeholder confidence. By prescribing a strict, non-extendable timeline for filing appeals, the legislature has sought to ensure that appellate proceedings do not become a tool for delaying or obstructing the insolvency resolution process.
Moreover, the IBC itself prescribes strict timelines for completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, with the outer limit being 330 days from the date of admission of the application. If appeals from orders passed during this process were permitted to be filed with liberal condonation of delay, it could potentially extend the overall duration of the insolvency proceedings well beyond the prescribed timelines, thereby defeating the purpose of the time-bound framework established by the Code.
Challenges and Criticisms of Strict Limitation Under Section 61
While the strict limitation period under Section 61 of the IBC serves important policy objectives, it has not been without criticism and challenges from various quarters. Legal practitioners, academics, and stakeholders have raised concerns about whether the forty-five day outer limit may, in certain circumstances, operate harshly and prevent genuine grievances from being heard on merits due to purely procedural reasons.
One of the primary criticisms relates to practical difficulties in obtaining certified copies of orders from the NCLT registry within a reasonable timeframe. In several instances, appellants have reported delays of several weeks in receiving certified copies of orders, even when applications for such copies were filed promptly. Given that the thirty-day period for filing appeals runs from the date of receipt of the order, any administrative delay in the issuance of certified copies can significantly reduce the time available for preparing and filing a comprehensive appeal. While the NCLAT has held that appellants should not wait for certified copies and can file appeals based on office copies or plain copies initially, this approach may not always be practical, particularly when the appellant needs to verify specific details or reasoning contained in the order before formulating grounds of appeal.
Another concern relates to the increasing complexity of insolvency proceedings and the volume of documentation involved. In large corporate insolvency cases, orders passed by the NCLT may run into hundreds of pages and may involve detailed consideration of financial statements, valuation reports, resolution plans, and other technical documents. Appellants may require time to review such voluminous orders, consult with financial and technical experts, and prepare well-reasoned grounds of appeal that address the specific issues raised in the order. The thirty-day period, with a maximum extension of fifteen days, may in some cases be insufficient for this purpose.
There have also been situations where appellants have faced genuine difficulties due to factors beyond their control, such as sudden illness, natural calamities, or technical failures in electronic filing systems. While such circumstances might have constituted sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the more liberal provisions of the Limitation Act, the strict outer limit of forty-five days under Section 61 of the IBC leaves no room for condonation even in such exceptional cases if the forty-fifth day has passed.
Some commentators have argued that the strict timeline under Section 61 of IBC may disproportionately affect certain categories of stakeholders who may not have the resources or sophistication to navigate the procedural requirements of the NCLT and NCLAT. Operational creditors, who are often small businesses or individual service providers, may lack the legal expertise and organizational capacity to respond swiftly to adverse orders. Similarly, workmen and employees who have claims against the corporate debtor may find it challenging to engage legal representation and file appeals within the compressed timeframe provided under the Code.
Despite these criticisms, it must be acknowledged that the strict limitation period under Section 61 is a deliberate legislative choice aimed at achieving the larger objectives of the IBC. The Supreme Court in various judgments has upheld the constitutional validity of the IBC’s provisions and has emphasized that the Code represents a carefully balanced framework that seeks to protect the interests of all stakeholders while ensuring swift resolution of insolvency. Any relaxation of the strict timelines could potentially undermine this balance and lead to prolonged litigation that defeats the time-bound nature of the insolvency process.
Moreover, it can be argued that the strict timeline operates as an incentive for all stakeholders to remain vigilant and proactive in protecting their rights. In the context of insolvency proceedings, where significant commercial interests are at stake and where delays can result in substantial value erosion, it is reasonable to expect parties to exercise heightened diligence in monitoring developments and taking timely legal action when necessary. The NCLAT Chennai’s observation that appellants must remain vigilant about their rights reinforces this expectation and places the onus on parties to be proactive rather than reactive.
Best Practices for Filing Appeals Under Section 61 of the IBC
In light of the strict limitation period under Section 61 of IBC and the limited scope for condonation of delay as established by the NCLAT Chennai and other judicial pronouncements, it is essential for potential appellants and their legal counsel to adopt best practices that minimize the risk of appeals being rejected as time-barred. The following practical guidelines can help ensure compliance with the procedural requirements for filing appeals under the IBC.
First, parties involved in insolvency proceedings should establish a systematic process for tracking all orders passed by the NCLT. This can be achieved through regular monitoring of the NCLT’s online portal, maintaining a database of case-related developments, and designating specific individuals within the organization or legal team who are responsible for tracking orders and calculating limitation periods. Automated alert systems can be set up to send notifications when new orders are uploaded or when important deadlines are approaching.
Second, upon receipt of an order from the NCLT, whether in physical or electronic form, parties should immediately document the date of receipt and begin the process of evaluating whether the order is appealable and whether there are grounds for filing an appeal. This evaluation should be completed within the first week of receiving the order to allow maximum time for preparing the appeal. Internal stakeholders should be consulted promptly, and a decision on whether to file an appeal should be taken expeditiously.
Third, if a decision is made to file an appeal, the drafting of the memorandum of appeal and compilation of supporting documents should begin immediately. The memorandum of appeal should clearly and concisely set out the grounds of challenge, with specific reference to provisions of law, factual findings in the impugned order, and any errors of law or procedure that are being alleged. Supporting documents should be properly paginated, indexed, and organized to facilitate easy reference by the NCLAT.
Fourth, applications for certified copies of the impugned order and any other relevant documents should be filed with the NCLT registry at the earliest possible opportunity. While appellants can file appeals based on plain copies or office copies if certified copies are not available, having certified copies strengthens the appeal and avoids potential objections regarding the authenticity of documents. If there are delays in obtaining certified copies from the registry, the appellant should maintain a record of all correspondence and follow-up actions taken to procure such copies, as this may be relevant if any question arises regarding the delay in filing the appeal.
Fifth, the appeal fee should be calculated accurately and arrangements should be made for payment well in advance of the filing date. Any errors in payment of the appeal fee can result in objections being raised to the maintainability of the appeal, and rectifying such errors takes time that may not be available when operating close to the limitation period. Cross-verification of the fee calculation by multiple members of the legal team can help prevent such errors.
Sixth, where possible, appeals should be filed at least a few days before the expiry of the thirty-day period, rather than waiting until the last possible day. This provides a buffer in case there are any technical difficulties with electronic filing systems, last-minute objections from the registry regarding defects in the appeal papers, or other unforeseen complications. If it becomes necessary to seek condonation of delay, filing the appeal within the first forty days provides a better chance of success compared to filing on the forty-fifth or forty-sixth day.
Seventh, if there are any genuine difficulties that prevent timely filing of the appeal, such as sudden illness of key personnel, natural calamities, or system failures, these should be documented contemporaneously with supporting evidence. If an application for condonation of delay becomes necessary, having contemporary documentation of the reasons for delay strengthens the application significantly. However, appellants should be realistic about their prospects of success and should not rely on obtaining condonation of delay beyond the forty-five day period under any circumstances.
Eighth, legal counsel representing clients in insolvency proceedings should maintain detailed time-management systems and should set internal deadlines that are earlier than the statutory deadlines. For instance, an internal deadline of twenty-five days for filing appeals (as opposed to the statutory thirty days) provides a safety margin that can accommodate unforeseen delays or complications. Regular case review meetings should be held to assess the status of pending matters and to identify upcoming deadlines.
Finally, parties should ensure that there is clarity regarding who has authority to take decisions on behalf of the organization or entity that is considering filing an appeal. In the case of corporate entities, board resolutions or appropriate delegations of authority should be in place to enable authorized representatives to file appeals without waiting for approval processes that may consume valuable time. Similarly, in the case of financial creditors who are part of a consortium or group, coordination mechanisms should be established to enable swift decision-making when appeals need to be filed.
The Role of Technology in Enhancing Compliance with Procedural Requirements
The increasing digitization of legal processes offers significant opportunities to enhance compliance with the strict timelines under Section 61 of the IBC. Both the NCLT and NCLAT have made substantial progress in implementing electronic filing systems, online case management portals, and digital communication mechanisms. Leveraging these technological tools effectively can help stakeholders minimize the risk of missing deadlines and ensure smoother processing of appeals.
The e-filing system for the NCLT and NCLAT allows parties to file appeals, applications, and other documents electronically without the need to physically visit the tribunal’s registry. This system has become particularly important in the post-pandemic era, where remote working and virtual hearings have become commonplace. Electronic filing eliminates delays associated with physical transportation of documents, allows for filing outside of regular office hours (subject to system availability), and provides instant acknowledgment of receipt of documents.
However, the electronic filing system also presents certain challenges that parties must be aware of. Technical glitches, server downtimes, and issues with digital signature certificates can prevent successful filing of documents. To mitigate these risks, parties should test the e-filing system well in advance of critical deadlines, maintain backup copies of all documents to be filed, and have contingency plans for physical filing in case electronic filing is not possible.
The online case status portal maintained by the NCLT allows parties to track the progress of cases, view cause lists, and access orders passed by the tribunal. Regular monitoring of this portal enables parties to stay informed about developments in their cases and to receive prompt notice when orders are passed. Some legal technology firms have developed tools that automatically scrape data from these portals and send alerts to users when there are updates in their cases. Utilizing such tools can enhance vigilance and ensure that no critical order or deadline is missed.
Case management software and legal practice management tools can also play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with limitation periods. These tools typically include features such as automated deadline calculation, calendar integration, reminder notifications, and workflow management. By implementing such systems, law firms and corporate legal departments can create systematic processes for managing appeals under the IBC and reduce the risk of human error leading to missed deadlines.
Email and mobile communication systems enable real-time coordination between clients, legal counsel, and other stakeholders involved in the decision to file an appeal. Encrypted communication platforms ensure that sensitive discussions about case strategy and appeal prospects can be conducted securely while maintaining the ability to respond quickly to developments. Video conferencing tools facilitate rapid consultation meetings when physical presence is not possible, thereby eliminating delays that might otherwise arise from scheduling in-person meetings.
Looking ahead, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and machine learning may offer even more sophisticated tools for managing legal compliance. AI-powered systems could potentially analyze orders passed by the NCLT, identify appealable issues, calculate limitation periods automatically, and even draft preliminary versions of memoranda of appeal based on the grounds identified in the system. While such advanced applications are still in early stages of development in the Indian legal context, they represent a promising direction for enhancing efficiency and reducing the risk of procedural lapses.
Conclusion: Balancing Procedural Strictness with Substantive Justice
The NCLAT Chennai’s judgment in Mathew Mylakulath Jose vs. Kizhakkekara Kuriakose Jose & Resolution Professional of ITMA Hotels India Pvt Ltd & Anr represents a clear articulation of the stringent approach that appellate tribunals under the IBC must adopt when dealing with applications for condonation of delay in filing appeals. The holding that sufficient cause should be an explanation and not an excuse, and that appeals filed beyond the forty-five day period cannot be entertained under any circumstances, reflects the legislative intent behind the time-bound framework of the IBC.
This strict approach serves important policy objectives. It ensures that insolvency proceedings are not prolonged indefinitely through delayed appeals and litigation. It incentivizes all stakeholders to remain vigilant and proactive in protecting their rights. It maintains the integrity of the time-bound resolution process that is central to the IBC’s design. And it prevents abuse of the appellate process by parties seeking to obstruct or delay the resolution of insolvency cases.
At the same time, the strictness of the limitation period under Section 61 of IBC requires all stakeholders in the insolvency ecosystem to adapt their practices and procedures accordingly. Legal counsel must exercise exceptional diligence in tracking orders, calculating limitation periods, and filing appeals within the prescribed timelines. Corporate entities and financial institutions must establish robust internal systems for decision-making and coordination on appellate matters. Operational creditors and other less sophisticated stakeholders may need to seek early legal advice to ensure that their appellate rights are not inadvertently forfeited due to procedural lapses.
The broader context of IBC jurisprudence, including developments relating to the treatment of personal guarantees in resolution plans as discussed in the SVA Family Welfare Trust case, demonstrates the dynamic and evolving nature of insolvency law in India. As the IBC completes several years of implementation, courts and tribunals continue to interpret and refine various provisions of the Code, balancing the objectives of swift resolution, maximization of value, and protection of stakeholder interests.
The challenge for the Indian insolvency framework going forward will be to maintain the benefits of strict procedural timelines while ensuring that genuine grievances are not shut out on purely technical grounds. This balance can be achieved through a combination of judicial vigilance, technological enhancement of filing and case management systems, increased awareness among stakeholders about procedural requirements, and perhaps periodic legislative review of whether the forty-five day limitation period strikes the right balance between procedural efficiency and access to justice.
For practitioners and stakeholders working with the IBC, the key takeaway from the NCLAT Chennai’s judgment is unambiguous: vigilance is not optional, and explanations must be genuine and well-documented. In the realm of insolvency law, where time is literally money and where delays can have cascading consequences for all stakeholders, the expectation of heightened procedural compliance is both reasonable and necessary. By understanding and adapting to these expectations, all participants in the insolvency process can contribute to the effective functioning of the IBC framework and the achievement of its transformative objectives for India’s economic landscape.
References
[1] The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
[3] Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407.
[4] B.K. Educational Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Parag Gupta & Associates, (2019) 11 SCC 633.
[5] N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123.
[6] Sagufa Ahmed & Ors. v. Upper India Steel Manufacturing & Engineering Co. Ltd., (2022) 5 SCC 520.
[7] SVA Family Welfare Trust & Anr v. Ujaas Energy Limited & Ors, NCLAT New Delhi (2020). Available at: https://nclat.nic.in
[8] State Bank of India v. V. Ramakrishnan & Anr (Lalit Kumar Jain case), (2018) 17 SCC 394.
[9] Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India. Available at: https://www.ibbi.gov.in
Authorized by Vishal Davda



