The war in Ukraine has become a stark showcase of modern military vulnerabilities, none more glaring than the recent reports of devastating Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian strategic bomber fleet. This isn’t just about battlefield losses; it’s a critical moment that forces us to examine how decades-old international agreements, designed for a different era, might create unforeseen risks. This analysis looks at the strategic and legal threads connecting these events, particularly the New START Treaty, and draws urgent lessons for nations like India striving to protect high-value military assets in an age of increasingly sophisticated asymmetric warfare.

1. The Unthinkable: Strategic Bombers, Cheap Drones, and a New Era of Vulnerability

Around June 1, 2025, the defense world was abuzz with claims from Ukraine: a significant portion of Russia’s long-range strategic bomber force—iconic Tu-95s, Tu-160s, and Tu-22s, along with vital A-50 AEW&C aircraft—had been successfully targeted and incapacitated in the highly publicized Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military assets. The alleged method was shockingly simple: a swarm of 117 relatively inexpensive, smuggled FPV drones aimed at aircraft parked in the open.¹

The financial hit, estimated at over USD 7 billion, is immense. But the strategic shockwave is far greater. These aircraft are key components of Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Their apparent susceptibility to low-cost drone attacks raises a critical question: how did these symbols of national power become so exposed? And could international commitments, specifically arms control treaties, have inadvertently played a part?

2. The New START Treaty: A Legacy of Openness in a Changing World

Central to this discussion is the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty), signed in 2010.

• Purpose and Design: New START was a landmark agreement aimed at maintaining strategic stability by setting verifiable limits on the nuclear arsenals of the world’s two largest nuclear powers. A key goal was a verification system that was effective yet less cumbersome than previous treaties.
• What the Treaty Covered: It set limits on deployed strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers) to 700 for each side, and deployed warheads to 1,550.¹⁵ (Article II). Russia’s Tu-95 “Bear” and Tu-160 “Blackjack” bombers are explicitly defined as “heavy bombers” under the treaty.¹⁶ (Protocol, Part One).
• Verification, Transparency, and an Unforeseen Outcome: The treaty’s verification measures are key to understanding the potential vulnerability.
  • Article XII allowed each side to use its “National Technical Means” (NTM) – think satellites – to monitor compliance. Importantly, it also stated that neither side should use “concealment measures that impede monitoring.”¹⁵
  • For on-site inspections, the Protocol (Part Five, Section VII, paragraph 10(d)(i)) was even more direct for heavy bombers: “Each heavy bomber…shall be located in the open, with no shelters or other objects that would hinder observation…”¹⁶
  • While the treaty didn’t mandate that bombers be permanently parked in the open, these powerful transparency clauses, combined with operational needs, fostered a practice of leaving these high-value assets visible. As the Eurasian Times reported, citing the Wall Street Journal, both Russia and the U.S. “often leaves long-range bombers parked outside and easily visible, both for operational reasons and as part of nuclear-treaty obligations.”¹

This framework, logical for ensuring transparency between two superpowers in the context of strategic arms, did not fully anticipate the rise of agile, non-state, or third-party actors who could exploit this openness with cheap, precision drone technology.

3. How Ukrainian Drone Strikes on Russian Bases Exploited Cold War-Era Vulnerabilities

Ukraine’s drone operations appear to have cleverly exploited this established pattern of asset visibility. These strategic bombers, many of them aging Soviet-era platforms that are hard to replace, became relatively easy targets. The Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian military bases demonstrated the alleged ability to smuggle and launch these drones deep within Russian territory to strike at well-known airbases—signaling a critical shift: transparency measures designed for Cold War-style strategic stability inadvertently created target opportunities for 21st-century asymmetric threats.

Even though Russia announced it was suspending its participation in New START in February 2023 (though the treaty technically remains in force until early 2026), years of ingrained basing practices driven by treaty compliance wouldn’t disappear overnight. The bombers were likely still, as described, “parked in plain sight of satellites, on open tarmac in clearly marked bays.”¹

4. Strategic Repercussions: Beyond Damaged Airframes

The consequences of such attacks are profound:

• Deterrence Under Pressure: The vulnerability of nuclear delivery systems to inexpensive drones can subtly undermine the perceived credibility of a nation’s strategic deterrent.
• Rethinking Treaty Risks: This incident forces a hard look at how transparency measures in future arms control agreements can be designed to prevent exploitation by actors not party to the treaty, without sacrificing essential verification.
• A Global Wake-Up Call for Airbase Defense: Militaries worldwide must now urgently re-evaluate their airbase security protocols, dispersal tactics, and the cost-effectiveness of investing in hardened shelters against the threat of drone swarms.

5. Lessons for India from Ukrainian Drone Strikes: Securing Our Skies and Bases in a New Threat Era

For India, with its complex neighborhood and persistent cross-border threats, the events in Ukraine offer stark and actionable lessons.

• The Ever-Present Drone Threat: The Ukrainian claim of successfully smuggling 117 FPV drones for a coordinated attack is a serious warning.¹ The 2021 drone attack on the Jammu airbase, though limited in damage, was India’s first clear indication of this evolving threat vector.¹⁷ Our adversaries could easily adopt similar tactics.
• Airbase Vulnerability Knows No Distance: While IAF forward bases are obvious concerns, the reported reach of Ukrainian drones deep into Russia shows that strategic depth alone is no longer a guarantee of safety. Even airbases further inland require robust, layered defenses.
• The Critical Danger of Encroachments Around Airbases: A major, often underappreciated, vulnerability for Indian airbases is the widespread illegal encroachment and dense, unregulated civilian construction packed against their perimeter walls. These areas create a security nightmare:
  • Ideal Cover for Attackers: They provide perfect staging grounds for hostile elements to assemble, prepare, and launch short-range drones with minimal warning.
  • Easy Surveillance for Adversaries: Proximity allows for easy monitoring of airbase activities, routines, and the location of assets.
  • Blind Spots for Security: Encroachments obstruct clear lines of sight for surveillance systems and complicate security patrols. Tackling these encroachments through determined legal and administrative efforts is no longer just a civic issue; it’s a vital national security requirement to deny adversaries easy access and launch points.
• Boosting India’s Anti-Drone Shield: India has been proactive. DRDO’s D4S (Drone Detect, Deter, and Destroy) system, with its “soft kill” (jamming) and “hard kill” (laser) options, is a key asset.² Emerging solutions like the Indrajaal autonomous drone defense dome also show promise.⁵
  • The Need for Scale and Speed: The challenge is the sheer scale and rapid evolution of the drone threat, including swarms. We need widespread deployment of advanced C-UAS systems, continuous upgrades, and rapid induction of new technologies.
• Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS): An Urgent Necessity: The sight of exposed Russian bombers being destroyed is a compelling argument for HAS. India’s MAFI (Modernisation of Air Field Infrastructure) program includes building HAS and underground facilities, especially at bases facing our primary threats.⁶٬⁷٬⁹
  • Accelerating the Effort: However, reports and analyses suggest that many airbases may still lack sufficient Next Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters (NGHAS) to protect our most valuable assets – Su-30MKIs, Rafales, Mirage 2000s – from modern precision strikes or concerted drone attacks.¹⁰ This needs to be a top priority.
• A Multi-Layered Defense Strategy is Key: No single solution will suffice. India needs:
  • Effective Kinetic & Non-Kinetic Systems: A smart mix of lasers, specialized guns, jammers, and cyber tools.
  • Resilient Infrastructure & Deception: More NGHAS, well-rehearsed dispersal plans, advanced Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (CCD), and the ability to operate from Emergency Landing Fields (ELFs).⁸
  • Proactive Regulatory Action: Working with state and local governments to create clear, encroachment-free zones around airbases.
  • Superior Intelligence & Agile Procedures: Enhanced intelligence on drone threats, dynamic alert systems, and constantly updated SOPs, tested through realistic drills.

6. Conclusion: Adapting to a New Age of Aerial Warfare 

The Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian strategic assets are more than just a series of tactical victories; they mark a significant shift in modern conflict. They highlight how international agreements, crafted with one set of threats in mind, can create unexpected vulnerabilities when faced with new technologies and asymmetric strategies.

For defense planners and strategists, especially in India, this is a clear call to action. It demands a proactive, comprehensive approach to airbase security that integrates advanced technology, robust infrastructure, smart doctrines, and the political will to address challenging issues like encroachments. The future effectiveness of our air power will depend as much on our ability to protect these assets on the ground as it does on their sophistication in the air.

Sources:

1. “Sitting Ducks” For Ukraine, How 2010 U.S.-Russia Treaty May Have Helped Kyiv To Annihilate Russian Bombers? EurAsian Times. Available at: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/did-a-2010-treaty-help-ukraine-in-targeting-russian-bombers/?amp
2. idrw.org. (May 16, 2025). India’s D4 Anti-Drone System Gains Global Attention After Success in Pakistan Conflict.
3. NEXT IAS. (December 10, 2024). India to Form Anti Drone Unit – Delhi.
4. Fortune India. (May 9, 2025). Precision from the skies: India’s drone moment is here as UAVs prove their mettle on the front line.
5. The Economic Times. (June 3, 2025). Is India ready for Ukraine-style Spiderweb attacks? Here’s all about FPV drones and how India plans to counter the $500 threat.
6. ThePrint. (April 15, 2024). Hardened shelters, radars, defence systems & more — IAF quietly upgrades bases focused on China. Available at: https://theprint.in/defence/hardened-shelters-radars-defence-systems-more-iaf-quietly-upgrades-bases-focused-on-china/1523714/
7. SWARAJYA. (April 16, 2024). Indian Air Force Is Slowly But Surely Upgrading Its Air Bases To Meet The China Challenge. Available at: https://swarajyamag.com/defence/indian-air-force-is-slowly-but-surely-upgrading-its-air-bases-to-meet-the-china-challenge
8. Indian Military Review. (April 20, 2024). IAF MODERNISATION-IAF Upgrade Base & Test Highway Landing.
9. EurAsian Times. (June 12, 2024). Indian Air Force ‘Prepares’ For China Clash; Upgrades Airbases, Develops New Runways To Check PLAAF. Available at: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/indian-air-force-prepares-for-china-clash-upgrades-airbases/
10. Analysts Forum India (AFI) / Defense Analysts. (June 3, 2025). Ukraine’s Drone Strike on Russian Strategic Bombers: A Wake-Up Call for the Indian Air Force. (General reference to analytical pieces of this nature).
11. Lawfare Blog. (June 2, 2025). The Situation: Has The Future of Violence Arrived? (General reference to analytical pieces of this nature).
12. The Economic Times. (June 3, 2025). Deep drone attacks in Russia hold key lessons for India.
13. United States Department of State. New START Treaty (Fact Sheet & Treaty Text). Available at: https://www.state.gov/new-start/
14. Nuclear Threat Initiative. New START Treaty (Full Text). Available at: https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/new_start_treaty_text_-_english.pdf
15. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Signed at Prague, April 8, 2010.
16. Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Signed at Prague, April 8, 2010.
17. Hindustan Times. (June 28, 2021). Jammu airbase attack: Use of drones poses new security risk. Available at: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/jammu-airbase-attack-use-of-drones-poses-new-security-risk-101624819206558.html
18. The Jamestown Foundation. (June 26, 2023). India’s Responses to Rising Drone Attacks on its Territory. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/indias-responses-to-rising-drone-attacks-on-its-territory/

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